CATEGORIES «RULE-MAKING» AND «LAW-MAKING»: AMBIGUITY OF DEFINITION AND CORRELATION IN LEGAL DOCTRINE

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to clarify and differentiate the concepts of rule-making and lawmaking, as well as to rethink their relationship with related categories. It is concluded that the our legal doctrine completely blurs the boundaries of the concepts of «rulemaking » and «formation of law». The content of the category «law-making», on the other hand, is quite well-established, but this term is often unreasonably replaced by the term «rule-making». It is established that rulemaking is a broad category that goes far beyond the formation of law, because it covers the emergence of all social norms that regulate behavior in society: moral, corporate, customary, religious, traditional, etc. The formation of law should be discussed only when actual, non-legal in nature, social regulators begin to «grow» from society to the official level. That is, the formation of law covers the following stages: 1) the emergence of certain relations in society that require regulation, and their scaling; 2) the emergence of actual regulators of these relations of a non-legal nature; 3) awareness by the lawmaker of the need to streamline public relations with the help of legal prescriptions (through the analysis of statistical indicators, expert assessments, surveys, etc.); 4) law-making, as the final, official stage of law formation. It is found out that rule-making coincides in scope with the formation of law (legal formation) only in cases when it comes to the creation of legal norms. Meanwhile, law-making does not coincide with law-making in terms of volume at all. It is a much broader category in relation to law-making. Just like all regulators of relations in society (social norms) are much larger in scope than law, which is only one type of such regulator. It is considered that Law-making is one of the types of rule-making that is associated exclusively with the adoption by the Parliament of laws as normative legal acts of the highest legal force. It is noted that the processes of interpretation and implementation of legal norms are not covered by either rulemaking or law-making, since they are included in the mechanism of legal regulation when the legal norm is already available (that is, after the end of law-making).