ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A SUBJECT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Abstract

The article examines the possibility of recognising artificial intelligence, namely large language models and generative models in their current form (hereinafter referred to as “artificial intelligence”), as a subject of intellectual property law. The relevance of the topic is determined by the increasing volume of the use of artificial intelligence in various spheres of social relations and its involvement in the creation of objects of intellectual property law. It is established that, despite the ability of artificial intelligence to create objects of intellectual property law, the current legislation of Ukraine does not provide for granting it the legal status of a subject of intellectual property law. The current legislation of Ukraine is analysed, and it is established that, notwithstanding the role of artificial intelligence in the creation of objects of intellectual property law, the relevant rights arise exclusively in the developer of the program (artificial intelligence) or in the user of artificial intelligence. As a consequence, the results created by artificial intelligence are recognised as objects of intellectual property law without recognising the role of artificial intelligence in such creation. The issue of potential legal personality is examined with due regard to the functional characteristics of artificial intelligence and their comparison with the characteristics inherent in natural persons. For the purpose of comparing artificial intelligence and a natural person in their capacity to be a subject of intellectual property law, the properties and principles of the functioning of artificial intelligence in its technical dimension are analysed on the basis of scholarly publications devoted to the technical aspects of its operation and training. It is established that artificial intelligence operates on the basis of the algorithmic nature of processes grounded in predefined parameters and input data. It is demonstrated that the algorithmic nature of the processes performed by artificial intelligence indicates the absence of autonomous will and conscious understanding of the significance of actions. As a result of the study, it is established that, at the present stage, artificial intelligence does not possess the properties necessary for recognising it as a subject of intellectual property law. In particular, it is established that the absence of autonomous will and conscious awareness of actions renders impossible the independent exercise and bearing of rights and obligations, which constitutes a necessary prerequisite of legal personality. It is concluded that there are no grounds or expediency for granting artificial intelligence the legal status of a subject of intellectual property law.