THE RULE OF LAW AS A META-PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: GENERAL LEGAL ASPECT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION LIMITS

Abstract

The article examines the rule of law as a meta-principle of constitutional order and defitermines its general legal nature and the boundaries of constitutional interpretation. The relevance of the topic is stipulated by the lack of a comprehensive conceptualization of the rule of law that would reconcile its normative and value, structural, and functional dimensions, which complicates ensuring the internal consistency of the legal system and the formation of stable judicial practice. It is argued that the rule of law is not reduced to a set of separate elements (legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness, access to justice), but has a meta-principle character and serves as the normative basis for the legitimacy of the constitutional system itself. Three dimensions of the rule of law, namely ontological – as a condition for the existence of law in its normative quality; structural – as a criterion for the consistency and hierarchical order of norms; interpretative – as a methodological basis for the interpretation and application of national law, are identified. It is noted that the rule of law performs a dual function: restrictive, setting limits on the discretion of public authorities, and constitutive, determining the parameters of the legitimacy of legal regulation. It is proven that the rule of law functions as a meta-secondary norm that allows distinguishing between formal and substantive constitutionality and identifying the limits of permissible constitutional development. At the same time, it legitimizes the active role of constitutional jurisdiction and defines the limits of interpretation, preventing arbitrary judicial rule-making. It is emphasized that the correlation between the rule of law and popular sovereignty is not inherently conflictual. Constitutional democracy presupposes that the will of the majority is realized within and through law and therefore cannot be a source of arbitrariness. The rule of law does not negate democracy, but rather defines its conditions of possibility: it guarantees that democratic self-government takes place within normative limits that ensure respect for human rights and the inviolability of the foundations of the constitutional order. It is concluded that the rule of law is the structuring core of the constitutional order, ensuring its internal integrity, value orientation, and stability in the context of social transformations.