MONITORING THE «RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN» IN LEGAL DOCTRINE

Abstract

The article considers the problem of legal monitoring of the right to be forgotten in the doctrine of law.Investigating the problems raised, the author notes that the right to be forgotten in the legal doctrine is characterized by such a property as inflation, which is based on outdated information on legal issues. As a result, in the author's opinion, scientific research, having a doctrinal level, becomes unsuitable for application, because it is incomplete, outdated scientific developments, since it does not respond to the request for the problem that has arisen, the peculiarity of which requires a different methodological approach. And the application of such a legal doctrine can entail the inefficiency of scientific research.Within the framework of the conclusions, the author proves that the implementation of the right to be forgotten occurs as a result of legal monitoring, which is carried out by a legal scholar. Where, the legal monitoring of this right must be subject to certain principles, methodological tools, thanks to which it becomes possible to determine the suitability of a certain part of the scientific doctrine (scientific work) for application or its inapplicability. Such principles can be based on the idea of: validity, timeliness; inflation; methodological coherence and duplicity to a specific branch of law, the institution of law, the peculiarities of the emerging scientific problem; the hierarchy of doctrinal developments (monograph as a comprehensive study, scientific article, theses, etc., and, all of them vice versa), their "legal force" (relativity to the source of law on the basis of a foreign element), etc.The author notes that in the philosophical and legal sense, the "right to be forgotten" lies in the retrospective plane, the plane of legal reality and the implementation of the prognostic function of law, which determines the axiological value of this right. At the same time, the “right to be forgotten” in each of these level characteristics relies on the tool of legal facts, which determine the question of the appropriateness of the right to be forgotten, where one doctrinal provision appears as a legitimate legal fact (appropriate, valid, relevant), and another as not legitimate (outdated, not active, not relevant, one in which information about legal knowledge has been given up to information). Ultimately, it seems that these processes reflect nothing more than the legal nature of law, its effect, the meaning of creating the perfection of legal regulation, the manifestation of law.